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Chapter 1:
Introduction: Causes of Corruption – The Right
Question or the Right Perspective?
Gjalt de Graaf, Patrick von Maravic, and
Pieter Wagenaar  
1. Introduction
What causes corruption? Although no one would dispute how difficult that is
to answer, the question is perfectly clear. Isn’t it? Well… no. The Good
Cause is more about the question than an attempt to answer it.
A first difficulty is defining the explanandum. What do we mean by cor-
ruption? In our daily language and across the many academic disciplines that
study corruption, the definitions are numerous. The norms defining what cor-
ruption is (or integrity for that matter) vary across both societies and aca-
demic disciplines.
But more than the concept of corruption is troublesome to the question.
As stated by Caiden, Dwivedi, and Jabbra (2001: 21), ‘[j]ust as there are
many varieties of corrupt behavior, so there are multitudinous factors con-
tributing to corruption (…) So many explanations are offered that it is diffi-
cult to classify them in any systematic manner.’ Heywood (1997: 426) adds
that ‘[t]he complexity of the phenomenon makes it impossible to provide a
comprehensive account of the causes of political corruption’. Caiden,
Dwivedi, and Jabbra (2001: 21-26) list sources of corruption as psychologi-
cal, ideological, external, economic, political, socio-cultural, and technologi-
cal. But factors that contribute to corruption are, of course, not causes of cor-
ruption. ‘In sum, corruption can be attributed to almost anything (…). But
while the opportunities exist everywhere, the degree of corruption varies
widely among individuals, public agencies, administrative cultures, and geo-
graphic regions’ (Caiden/Dwivedi/Jabbra 2001: 26). Fijnaut and Huberts re-
mark: ‘Research shows that a conglomerate of social, economic, political, or-
ganizational and individual causal factors are important to explain cases of
public corruption’ (2002: 8).
More than corruption’s multiple factors make the question difficult: there
is also disagreement on what constitutes cause in scientific theory (see
Gerring 2005; Tilly 2000). We can think, for example, of a well-known, clear
corruption case and ask, why did it occur? To answer, we would first have to
ask what we want to know. Do we mean, why did the case start? If so, we are
looking for the immediate causes and circumstances of the corrupt transac-
Gjalt de Graaf, Patrick von Maravic, and Pieter Wagenaar14
tions and decisions, the corrupt acts themselves. Or do we want to know why
the case continued over a period of time and in connection with other cases?
If so, we are more interested in why a specific official had the readiness to
become corrupt. Perhaps we want to know why this particular corruption case
occurred rather than not. Were there alternatives for the corrupt official(s), or
were they in some way forced to do what they did? Was corruption, given the
causes and conditions, their only course of action? This raises the debate on
determinism versus free will. Maybe we are looking for the causes of the
particular case of corruption, the issue that gets most attention in corruption
research. In this context, are we interested in the causes external to the cor-
rupt act itself? The first is the most popular in the literature – not surpris-
ingly, since social sciences usually deal with concepts (see for example
Geddes 2003; Gerring 2001; Moses/Knutsen 2007) rather than processes and
thus ‘freeze’ reality (Schinkel 2004: 8). Corruption is then studied in an ab-
stract sense, looking for the governing laws of corruption at a micro, meso or
macro level. Another possible interpretation of the why question is: are you
interested in the reasons and motives for the official(s) to become corrupt?
This brings us to an issue often raised in philosophy, that is, whether reasons
for action can or should be seen as causes of action and, if so, in what sense
can they be treated (Schinkel 2004: 8).
2. Causality and corruption
A core subject of social sciences is understanding causal relations and ex-
plaining ‘phenomena in the world of our experience’ (Hempel/Oppenheim
1948: 135), which means nothing more than answering one of the now fa-
mous ‘why’ question. The concept itself, however, is subject to debate and
throughout the history of scientific discovery highly contested (Mackie
1985). Two fundamental positions seem to divide the issue. Positivists argue
in the unitary or logical deductivist tradition of Hempel and Oppenheim: all
causes need to be understood according to ‘general laws’, be a ‘logical con-
sequence of the explanans’, and the explanans must be empirical in nature in-
sofar as they can be tested or observed (Hempel/Oppenheim 1948: 137). Plu-
ralists, on the other hand, challenge the view of ‘invariant universal[s]’ (Tilly
1995: 1597) laws and argue instead that different types of causes, which are
not necessarily commensurable, exist (Gadenne 2001: 1562). For example,
Mr. Adams, a senior civil servant, accepts a bribe because he is heavily in
debt. But he could have taken the bribe in any case, so that owing a large sum
of money was not necessary to acting in a corrupt manner. Multi-causality is
normal rather than exceptional. As the least common denominator of a defi-
nition of cause, Gerring (2005: 169) suggests defining causes as ‘events or
conditions that raise the probability of some outcome occurring’, which im-
plies a ceteris paribus condition.
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In the philosophy of causality, an epistemological and an ontological tra-
dition can be distinguished (Schinkel 2004). In the first tradition, a cause is
the coinciding of phenomena where, because the cause always precedes the
consequence, a belief exists that there is a cause (Hume 1990/1739). This
kind of causality cannot be found in any scientific theory on corruption, how-
ever, because no cause can be identified that always coincides with the con-
sequence ‘corruption’. This leads all too often to confuse correlation with
causation. Causes identified in corruption research are not assumed always to
lead to corruption. The so-called necessity criterion, often named as a crite-
rion for causation (if A is the cause of B, B must occur when A occurs) is
such a strong one that it is not used in corruption theories, which makes cor-
ruption studies not too different from other social analyses.
In the ontological tradition, causality is seen as something that actually
happened. In social science this is often hard to identify, so neither is this
very helpful in corruption research. For example, in what way does GNP or
leadership exist, and how can it cause a particular corruption case? Bourdieu
has warned against ascribing intrinsic aspects to social phenomena since it
would amount to naturalizing something that is socially constructed
(Schinkel 2004: 14). An often-noted and general problem for corruption re-
search is that individual corruption cases are rarely being studied; the identi-
fied causes, therefore, are not triggering but most often predisposing. This
makes it difficult to explain corruption.
3. Theories of the causes of corruption
Taking these remarks as a departing point, in the following chapters we will
seek to identify different theories and schools of thought and analysis (which
can but do not necessarily map to disciplines) to understand their way of con-
ceptualizing the causes of corruption. Having mentioned the problem of de-
fining the explanandum in the beginning of this chapter, which is the cause of
corruption, the remainder of this chapter focuses on the theories of the causes
of corruption. How are causes of corruption theoretically framed? Under-
standing how different theories define, conceptualize, and eventually deduce
policy recommendations will amplify our understanding of the complexity of
corruption and illustrate the spectrum of possibilities to deal with it analyti-
cally as well as practically.
Corruption is a much-debated subject in both popular and in scientific
discourses (see for example Heidenheimer/Johnston/LeVine 1989). Relevant
research from a variety of scientific disciplines by a variety of scholars has
steadily accelerated in the last decade. The economic approach (e.g. Kauf-
mann/Kraay/Zoido-Lobatón 2000; Klitgaard 1991; Lambsdorff 2007; Rose-
Ackerman 1978, 1999, 2006; Treisman 2000) is arguably the most dominant
but certainly not the only scientific discourse on corruption.
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A glance at the growing number of different scientific studies on corrup-
tion leads to more questions than answers. Confusion exists in the literature
even within specific scientific disciplines. Which anti-corruption methods
work best under what circumstances? The answer is equivocal. It seems that
the theoretical model chosen to research corruption largely determines the di-
rection of the proposed solutions. Different causal chains lead to different
discourses on corruption prevention and control. Problems with comparisons
of the different perspectives and attempts to come to an accumulated body of
knowledge are hampered by the sometimes very different theoretical under-
pinnings. Confusion starts with the perspectives using different conceptuali-
zations of corruption. Our motivations for this book stem from a need to help
clear the confusion and the hope of uncovering less prominent theories of the
causes of corruption. ‘Outmoded’ conceptions of the causes of corruption
may help amplify the analytical and policy spectra, informing parties in both
domains.
The main question of this book is: how are the causes of corruption stud-
ied? The more we know about the causes of corruption, the better we can
choose the policy instruments to combat it. The more we know about the
policy instruments (dominantly) used and recommended the more we need to
know about the underlying conceptions of the causes of corruption.
The book presents the state of the art in a comparative study of the causes
of corruption. Different authors in the field of corruption analysis from dif-
ferent schools of thought shed light on the issue of corruption from different
theoretical perspectives. Corruption is currently studied within different dis-
ciplines and from different theoretical perspectives (Alemann 2005). Crimi-
nology, sociology, philosophy, public administration, economics, political
science, history, and psychology, for example, may have within them a rather
narrow set of theories and research methods that do not communicate well
with each other. Part of the problem seems to be the different conceptual and
theoretical starting points of the disciplines, leading to a ‘dialogue of the
deaf’. By making these differences explicit, The Good Cause will further the
important project of making the different corruption discourses intelligible to
each other within academia. Obviously, certain theoretical perspectives enjoy
at a certain place and time more prominence than others. This book aims to
emphasize that (1) each theory has its strengths and weaknesses, and (2) the
most prominent or hegemonious theory in practice and academia (such as the
economics of corruption in the last twenty years) is not necessarily the ana-
lytically strongest or most useful one. Taking account of the (dis)advantages
of different theoretical perspectives, such as structural functionalist theory,
new institutional economics of corruption, criminological, postmodern, and
systems theories, and others could therefore help analysts as well as practi-
tioners be aware of the blind spots in developing policies to fight corruption
and push researchers towards interconceptual analysis. The Good Cause
takes into perspective what has been done so far in conceptualizing and em-
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pirically studying the causes of corruption and what needs to be done in the
future.
4. Academic corruption discourses
The variety of scholarly disciplines within which corruption is studied results
in several academic discourses. Hoetjes (1977), a scholar studying develop-
ment administration, distinguishes four such clusters of corruption theories:
Weberian ideal-typical, structural functionalist, institutional economics, and
ecological. Since Hoetjes’s dissertation on corruption in India, however,
other academic corruption discourses have come into being. To the four
clusters we therefore add system theoretical, institutional design, post-
positivist, and criminological perspectives. Let us briefly introduce the eight
perspectives.
1. The Weberian-idealtypical approach (see Rubinstein/von Maravić, chap-
ter 2) sees corruption as a lack of rationalization of the public service. To
its proponents it is a phase on the route from patrimonialism to rational
legal authority (Hoetjes 1977: 53-55; Hoetjes 1982: 65-67; see e.g. Ru-
binstein 1983). Loopholes exist in the not fully developed bureaucratic
system for corrupt acts to occur.
2. The structural functionalist approach (see de Zwart, chapter 3) looks at
society as a collection of coherent systems in which all societal phenom-
ena have a function. Structural functionalist-inspired scholars therefore
ask themselves which function corruption fulfills in a certain society
(Hoetjes 1977: 55-57; Hoetjes 1982: 67-69). ‘Brokerage’, for example, is
such a function when corrupt officials facilitate action between the central
and the local levels (Blockmans 1988; Campbell 1989: 334; Huiskamp
1991, 1995). Corruption can serve to tone down unduly harsh laws
(McFarlane 1996: 58-59) or provide protection and influence for social
groups with material wealth but little or no political power (Waquet 1992:
62). The most elaborate example of a structural functionalist approach to
corruption can be found in Fred Riggs’s theory of the prismatic society
(Riggs 1964).
3. Adherents of the institutional economics approach (see Rose-Ackerman,
chapter 4) see corrupt officials as rational utility maximizers who simply
take the most profitable course of action (Hoetjes 1977: 57-60; Hoetjes
1982: 69-71; Klitgaard 1991; Lambsdorff 2007; Rose-Ackerman 1978).
Rose-Ackerman says of this style of analysis, ‘[i]n a study of corruption,
one can make substantial progress with models that take tastes and values
as given and perceive individuals as rational beings attempting to further
their own self-interest in a world of scarce resources’ (Rose-Ackerman
1978: 4). Rose-Ackerman’s work on the causes of corruption within or-
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ganizations gives us a first idea for exploring the topic. Her conclusion is
that each organizational structure is vulnerable to exploitation by unscru-
pulous officials but the structures vary with respect to the locus of cor-
ruption (1993: 817). Rose-Ackerman argues that the structure of the bu-
reaucracy determines the discretionary power of an actor and the expected
costs of accepting a bribe (1993: 803). As new forms of administrative
systems emerge, the question of where to identify potential risks of cor-
ruption in the systems is relevant to a better understanding of the situa-
tion. The institutional economics approach consists of several sub-
theories and -streams such as rent-seeking and transaction cost theory
(e.g. Lambsdorff 2002a, b).
4. The ecological approach involves combining micro, meso, and macro
levels of corruption research. Mackie’s (1985) INUS (Insufficient but
Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient) conditions play an im-
portant role in this approach. Huberts introduces a similar concept in the
multi-approach (see Huberts, chapter 9).
5. System theory is Niklas Luhmann’s (cf. Brans/Rossbach 1997) approach
to corruption (see Hiller, chapter 5). Society is divided into separate, self-
referential, autopoietic value systems. Corruption results from overlap-
ping systems, for instance, when values from the economic system pene-
trate the legal or political system (Luhmann 1995a), resulting in the abuse
of another system’s logic (‘Sinnlogik’; Hiller 2005: 61).
6. Adherents of the institutional design of political systems (e.g. Ger-
ring/Thacker 2004; Johnston 2005; Kunicova/Rose-Ackerman 2005; Ma-
now 2005) approach believe that institutions shape behavior and that
therefore some political systems are more prone to corruption than others
(see Peters, chapter 6).1 The study of the link between political institu-
tions and ergo-political governance arrangements and corruption empha-
sizes the different impact of types of political systems. The core theoreti-
cal concept is grounded in the assumption of political competition, which
                                                          
1 Unlike interest-based theories, neo-institutional theories emphasize the embeddedness of in-
dividual preferences and action in collective social settings (DiMaggio/Powell 1991: 11;
Goodin 1996: 7). Individual behavior is shaped by rules, symbols, routines, norms, scripts,
and templates (Hall/Taylor 1996: 15). Institutions therefore make behavior predictable by
mitigating ambiguity and unpredictability in complex and dynamic social settings
(March/Olsen 1989: 22-24). Actors follow rules they consider legitimate, i.e., those that
have a shared understanding of what is right, true, reasonable, and good. Seeking identity or
fulfilling the expectations and obligations “encapsulated in a role” (March/Olsen 2006: 689)
is a central element in this theory. Instead of calculating the net benefit of alternative op-
tions, conformity or the logic of appropriateness explains decisions. Not consequence, like-
lihood, or value matter but “criteria of similarity and congruence” (March/Olsen 2006: 690).
To act appropriately simply means to act in accordance with institutionalized practices of a
collective. Corruption or deviance from accepted norms and standards occurs when institu-
tions do not fulfill this “sense-making” function and therefore create uncertainty and disor-
der; the “aggregative” institution (March/Olsen 1989: 118, 137) itself starts to propagate to
maximize the net benefit of alternative options.
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emphasizes the ideal of elections as sufficient means of control and ac-
countability. Such an analytical perspective seeks to explore disparate
causal mechanisms such as openness and transparency, party competition,
decision-making rules, or collective action problems. It often tries to ex-
plain political corruption with deficits of competition. Are parliamentary
democracies more prone to corruption than presidential ones, or do uni-
tary systems lead to lower levels of corruption than federal systems?
7. The post-positivist approach focuses on how corruption is socially con-
structed (de Graaf/Wagenaar/Hoenderboom, chapter 7). The American
political scientist Michael Johnston has defined corruption as ‘the abuse,
according to the legal or social standards constituting a society’s system
of public order, of a public role or resource for private benefit’ (Johnston
1996: 331-334). He invites us to investigate how the content of notions of
abuse, public role, and private benefit are contested in specific places and
at specific times. Johnston is interested in finding out how clashes over
the boundaries between public and private, politics and administration, in-
stitutions and sources of power, state and society, private and collective
interests, and the allocative limits of the market develop, because it is
precisely during such conflicts that concepts such as integrity and corrup-
tion acquire their meaning (Johnston 1996). From such a cultural or con-
structivist perspective, corruption manifests as a specific type of social
relationship. Its social meaning must be understood with reference to its
social setting (Sissener 2001). Consequently, the meaning of deviancy
varies from society to society and throughout history. There is neither a
universal understanding of corruption (or nepotism or deviancy) nor are
the phenomena grounded in the dark side of humans. Instead they repre-
sent social mechanisms to achieve solidarity between and within kinship
groups (Tänzler 2007). According to this understanding, focusing on the
perceptions of corruption reveals the social construction of reality. Em-
pirical research therefore emphasizes the importance of narratives and ar-
guments in understanding the subjective perspective of reality.
8. Those who take the criminological approach (Huisman/Vande Walle,
chapter 8) are interested in individual corrupt officials and apply crimi-
nological theories to them. De Graaf and Huberts (2008) studied ten
Dutch corruption cases and drew attention to the importance of the psy-
chological make-up of the perpetrators involved. Corrupt officials in the
Netherlands, it turns out, are often highly popular with their colleagues
because of their openness and flair, and especially their ability to ‘get
things done’. They are usually males, whose orientation to problem solv-
ing rather than problem creating tends to make them valuable to their or-
ganizations. Yet it is precisely their unorthodox, results-oriented mode of
operation that makes them cross the thin line between laudable and lam-
entable behavior.
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The Good Cause is structured to allow the variously schooled authors to in-
troduce you to their particular perspectives. They discuss the definition and
models used within them, give examples of empirical studies, describe their
research methods (for example, quantitative or qualitative), and evaluate their
inherent strengths and weaknesses. Last, the authors review the perspectives’
empirical insights to show what they add to the discussion at hand: the ques-
tion of what causes corruption.
